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LAST CLEAR CHANCE-
Trend in California
By G. RoBE=T HALE*
IN THE DEVELOPMENT of the doctrine of last clear chance in
California, there has been a conflict of opinion on the propriety of
giving the instruction to the jury. In view of the evidence presented,
is it proper for the court to hold, as a matter of law, that a defendant
did not have a last clear chance to avoid an accident, or should the
determination be made by the jury? Because the cases under the
doctrine usually present close questions of fact and because the evi-
dence is usually conflicting, the question is highly debatable. Prior
to 1957, a liberal view, which favored determination by the jury, pre-
vailed. In the past few years, the application of the doctrine has been
restricted. Before an instruction will be given, the plaintiff must af-
firmatively prove the existence of every element of the doctrine to the
satisfaction of the court.1 The reasoning behind this conservative
trend and its effect on the law can best be discovered by a review
of the doctrine itself, and by an examination of some recent decisions.
Underlying Policies
The doctrine of last clear chance is generally regarded as an ex-
ception to the rule that contributory negligence is a defense to an
action for negligence. It is said to be based on the humanitarian con-
cept that the fault of the injured party should not relieve an erring
defendant of liability if the defendant was afforded a last clear chance
to avoid the accident after actually discovering that it was too late for
the injured party to avail himself of any similar chance. 2
The doctrine has also been supported in the light of the proximate
cause element of the ordinary law on contributory negligence by
pointing out that, where the elements of the doctrine are present, the
defendant's failure to make use of a last clear chance to avoid an
accident is considered the sole proximate cause of the accident. Re-
ferring to this theory, it has been said that the main factor that may
make the plaintiff's negligence a remote rather than a proximate cause
in the eyes of the law is the existence of some such appreciable in-
terval of time after the plaintiff reaches a state of helplessness as to
* Member, Second Year class.
iRodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal. 2d 290, 246 P.2d 663 (1952).
35 CAL. Jtrm. 2d, Negligence, § 252 (1957).
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enable the defendant to gain actual knowledge thereof and have a
last clear chance to avoid, the accident.8
Elements of the Doctrine
The necessary elements which must be found to warrant the ap-
plication of the doctrine are stated in the leading case of Brandelius
v. City and County of San Francisco4 which requires that the evidence
must show that:
1. The plaintiff was in a position of danger and, by his own neg-
ligence, became unable to escape from such position by the use of
ordinary care, either because it became physically impossible for him
to escape or because he was totally unaware of the danger.
2. The defendant knew that plaintiff was in a position of danger
and further knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have
known, that plaintiff was unable to escape therefrom.
3. Thereafter defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed to exercise such
last clear chance, and the accident occurred as a proximate result of
such failure.5
The elements of the doctrine are well understood. As stated pre-
viously, the basic conflict is whether determination of the existence or
non-existence of any last clear chance is a proper function of the
judge or the jury.
A Liberal Trend
In 1951, the Supreme Court of California decided the cases of
Peterson v. Burkhalter6 and Selinsky v. Olsen.7 It was then stated
that a turning point in the application of the doctrine had been
reached, and that a liberal trend was on the march.8 In the Peterson
case, the court held that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that a
defendant with two seconds to act does not have a last clear chance
to avoid the accident. Such a defendant may have sufficient time in
which to do something, either by turning his automobile or by sound-
ing his horn. In the Selinsky case, the defendant testified that he did
not see the plaintiffs automobile, but other evidence showed that the
defendant was looking straight ahead and that his view was unob-
structed. The court held that the jury could infer that the defendant
had actually seen the plaintiff and left the determination of the exist-
3 Ibid.
447 Cal. 2d 729, 306 P.2d 432 (1957).
5 Formula reiterated in Hildebrand v. Los Angeles Junction Ry., 53 Cal. 2d 826,
3 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1960).
638 Cal. 2d 107, 237 P.2d 977 (1951).
738 Cal. 2d 102, 237 P.2d 645 (1951).
8 For a full discussion of the doctrine prior to 1951 and the impact of the Peterson
and Selinsky cases, see Garon, Recent Developments in California's Last Clear Chance
Doctrine, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 404 (1952).
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ence of the remaining elements of the doctrine to the jury.9 Following
these decisions, the doctrine was applied with regularity" notwith-
standing opposition by conservative forces."
Conservative Trend
In 1957, the Supreme Court of California, in the Brandelius case,
laid a basis for a tightening of the application of the doctrine when it
clarified the instruction of last clear chance. The main purpose of the
restatement of the formula was to make it clear that the time element
is the all-important factor in deciding whether the doctrine is to be
applied, that is, the existence of any last clear opportunity to avoid
an accident depends mainly upon the amount of time available to the
defendant to act. The court emphasized that the exercise by defendant
of any last clear chance commences only at such time as defendant
has both actual knowledge of the injured person's position of danger
and actual or constructive knowledge that the injured person cannot
escape from such situation. 12
The emphasis on the time element gave to the strict construction-
ists new ammunition. As can be seen from an examination of recent
decisions in the California appellate courts, the liberal view is being
restricted from further expansion.
9 Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal. 2d 630, 255 P.2d 795 (1953), where
the court said: "As held in a number of cases, where a person sees another in a position
which is in fact dangerous, he may not rely upon dullness to excuse him from not realiz-
ing the danger of the position; and if he sees the dangerous situation he must use reason-
able diligence in analyzing the same, knowledge of danger being imputed where the
circumstances are such as to convey to the mind of a reasonable man that the plaintiff
is in a position of peril."
10 Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra note 9; Daniels v. City and County of
San Francisco, 40 Cal. 2d 614, 255 P.2d 785 (1953); Femer v. Casalegno, 141 Cal.
App. 2d 467, 297 P.2d 91 (1956); Mason v. Hart, 140 Cal. App. 2d 349, 295 P.2d 28
(1956); Ingram v. Bob Jaffe Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d 193, 293 P.2d 132 (1956); Jones
v. Gilland, 137 Cal. App. 2d 486, 290 P.2d 329 (1955); Hardin v. Key System Transit
Lines, 134 Cal. App. 2d 677, 286 P.2d 373 (1955); Lebkicher v. Crosby, 123 Cal. App.
2d 631, 267 P.2d 361 (1954); Summers v. Randall, 123 Cal. App. 2d 113, 266 P.2d 217
(1954); Buck v. Hill, 121 Cal. App. 2d 352, 263 P.2d 643 (1953); Perin v. Nelson &
Sloan, 119 Cal. App. 2d 560, 259 P.2d 959 (1953); Simmer v. City and County of San
Francisco, 116 Cal. App. 2d 724, 254 P.2d 185 (1953); Hopkins v. Carter, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 912, 241 P.2d 1063 (1952); Galbraith v. Thompson, 108 Cal. App. 2d 617,
239 P.2d 468 (1952).
11 Cases which held that facts did not justify application of the doctrine are: Doran
v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 2d 477, 283 P.2d 1 (1955); Sparks v. Red-
inger, 44 Cal. 2d 121, 279 P.2d 971 (1955); Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal. 2d 290, 246
P.2d 663 (1952); Nippold v. Romero, 145 Cal. App. 2d 235, 302 P.2d 367 (1956);
Nesie v. Metropolitan Coach Lines, 140 Cal. App. 2d 807, 295 P.2d 979 (1956); Fle-
harty v. Boltzen, 137 Cal. App. 2d 187, 290 P.2d 311 (1955); Mehling v. Zigman, 116
Cal. App. 2d 729, 254 P.2d 141 (1953); Jobe v. Harold Livestock Commission Co., 113
Cal. App. 2d 269, 247 P.2d 951 (1952).
12 Kowalski v. Shell Chemical Corp., 177 Cal. App. 2d 528, 2 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1960).
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Peterson Case Restricted
One example of this change in attitude may best be shown by a
comparison of Guyton v. City of Los Angeles,5 which follows the
Peterson case, and Fambrini v. Stikkers,14 which restricts further ex-
tension.
In the Guyton case, the plaintiff drove his bicycle from a driveway
into the street and was .struck by a police car owned by defendant city.
The car was traveling approximately seventeen miles per hour. The
driver, at the instant he saw plaintiff, hit his brakes and skidded to a
stop. The driver made no attempt to swerve the car. The court, citing
the Peterson case, held that where it could be argued that the driver
had approximately four seconds and from sixty-nine to ninety feet
within which to alter his course, there was validity to plaintiff's theory
that the accident could have been avoided if the driver had turned
into another lane, and that the jury should have been instructed on
last clear chance.
In the Fambrini case, the plaintiff was traveling down a hill on his
bicycle at a rapid rate of speed and hit the side of the defendant's car,
which was crossing the intersection. The bicycle and car were ninety
feet apart when defendant first saw plaintiff, and several seconds
elapsed before the collision. The car was traveling from fifteen to
twenty miles per hour. Defendant immediately applied her brakes and
brought the car to a full stop, although she made no attempt to swerve.
Plaintiff advanced the theory of the Peterson case, pointing out that
the defendant could have avoided the collision by swerving 5 the car
or by blowing the horn.16 The court held, as a matter of law, that these
courses of action were not available to defendant saying:1 7
... [It must be noted that the parties in the swerving cases all failed
to bring their vehicles to a halt, which is an important distinction,
but even more crucial is the fact that they hit victims who at the time
were standing still and hence, swerving would have avoided the ac-
cident, while such is mere speculation here.
It may be open to serious doubt whether any distinction exists be-
tween the facts of the two cases. Can it be said, as a matter of law,
that a swerve of even two or three feet was not available to defend-
ant?18 Nevertheless, the distinction drawn does show that the attitude
13 174 Cal. App. 2d 354, 344 P.2d 910 (1959).
14 183 Cal. App. 2d 235, 6 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1960).
15 Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 205, 13 P.2d 918 (1932); Girdner v. Union
Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932); Parrott v. Furesz, 153 Cal. App. 2d 26, 314
P.2d 47 (1957).
16 Jones v. Gillard, 137 Cal. App. 2d 486, 290 P.2d 329 (1955); Lebkicher v.
Crosby, 123 Cal. App. 2d 631, 267 P.2d 361 (1954).
17 183 Cal. App. 2d 235, 241-42, 6 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837 (1960).
18 Fambrini v. Stikkers, supra note 14. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Good con-
tended that it is not mere speculation to assume that if vehicles'have even three or four
feet of space between them they do not ordinarily collide.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
of the court has changed. Emphasis is being placed upon the time
element; the existence of a sufficient time within which to act, where
both vehicles are in motion, is to be determined by the judge.
Selinsky Case Restricted
Kowalski v. Shell Chemical Corp.19 offers another example of the
present attitude. In that case, plaintiff's motorcycle and defendant's
automobile, driven by its employee, collided at an intersection. The
driver testified that he did not see the plaintiff until just before the
collision. The driver's view of the intersection was obstructed by a
truck which was double-parked. By calculations of braking distance,
the plaintiff contended that the driver saw the plaintiff before his
view was obstructed. The trial court gave the requested instruction
on last clear chance and defendant appealed. The appellate court re-
versed the decision holding, as a matter of law, that the evidence was
not sufficient to enable the jury to infer that the defendant had actual
knowledge that the plaintiff was in a position of danger.
The court approved of the proposition of the Selinsky case that
actual knowledge may be inferred where it is a reasonable inference
to be drawn from the evidence. The court then pointed out that, al-
though the Selinsky opinion stated that the defendant could have seen
the plaintiff's car, the evidence showed that the defendant "must have
seen" the plaintiff, not that the defendant could have seen the plaintiff
at an earlier time. Even if, the driver did see the plaintiff, the court
stated that the fact that a defendant actually sees the plaintiff some
considerable time before the accident does not necessarily make the
doctrine applicable. 20 There must also be evidence to indicate that-
plaintiff was in a position of peril from which he could not escape,
and that the defendant knew this, because the evidence of a sufficient
time within which to avoid an accident commences to run only after
this fact is known to the defendant.
In the Selinsky case, after finding that actual knowledge could
reasonably be inferred, the court held that it was for the jury to deter-
mine whether or not defendant had a last clear chance. On the other
hand the decision in the Kowalski case seems to infer that the existence
of sufficient evidence to support each element, especially the time
element, is to be determined by the judge.21
Present and Future
As the law now stands, the cases show a definite trend toward a
tightening of the application of the doctrine.22 Emphasis on the rule
10 177 Cal. App. 2d 528, 2 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1960).
20 Miller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 166 Cal. App. 2d 160, 332 P.2d 746 (1958);
Daley v. Williams, 73 Cal. App. 2d 435, 166 P.2d 599 (1946).
2 I-lckambottom v. Cooper Transp. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d -, 9 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1960).
22 Cases which held that the facts justified the application of the doctrine are:
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that the existence of substantial evidence to support each element is
a question of law lessens the plaintiff's chances of obtaining an in-
struction to the jury. Furthermore, if the plaintiff does obtain an
instruction, he places himself in danger of reversal on the finding by
the appellate court that such evidence is lacking.23
The present attitude of the courts may best be summarized in the
words of Justice Schauer: "But until ... we no longer have to call the
basic principle the doctrine of last clear chance I think that we should
refrain from applying it to facts which on any reasonable view of the
evidence give the party charged no more than a slight or possible
chance." 24
Although both parties are at fault, the doctrine of last clear chance
allows the contributorily negligent party to collect full damages for
his injuries. 25 Perhaps dissatisfaction with the doctrine itself is the
underlying reason for the court's reluctance to extend its coverage.
Whatever the reasons, the volume of litigation on the subject and the
need for certainty point to the urgency of legislative study. The doc-
trine of last clear chance is said to be a transitional one, a stepping-
stone to apportionment of damages. 26 The step is well worn.
McAllister v. Kyles, 186 Cal. App. 2d -, 8 Cal Rptr. 909 (1960); Ransdell v. Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Auth., 185 Cal. App. 2d -- , 8 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1960);
Guyton v. City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal. App. 2d 354, 344 P.2d 910 (1959); Nahhas
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 153 Cal. App. 2d 91, 313 P.2d 886 (1957); Parrott v.
Furesz, 153 Cal. App. 2d 26, 314 P.2d 47 (1957); Heffington v. Paul, 152 Cal. App.
2d 235, 313 P.2d 157 (1957).
Cases which held that facts did not justify the application of the doctrine are:
Hildebrand v. Los Angeles Junction Ry., 53 Cal. 2d 826, 3 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1960);
Welch v. Gardner, 187 Cal. App. 2d -, 9 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1960); Hickambottom v.
Cooper Transp. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d -- , 9 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1960); Dyer v. Knue, 186
Cal. App. 2d -- , 8 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960); Kavner v. Holzmark, 185 Cal. App. 2d -,
8 Cal Rptr. 145 (1960); Todd v. Southern Pac. Co., 184 Cal. App. 2d -- , 7 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1960); Fambrini v. Stikkers, 183 Cal. App. 2d 235, 6 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1960); Bell
v. Huson, 180 Cal. App. 2d 820, 4 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1960); Warren v. Ubungen, 177
Cal. App. 2d 605, 2 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1960); Kowalski v. Shell Chemical Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 2d 528, 2 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1960); Miller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 166 Cal. App.
2d 160, 332 P.2d 746 (1958); Holman v. Viko, 161 Cal. App. 2d 87, 326 P.2d 551
(1958); Barcelone v. Melani, 156 Cal. App. 2d 631, 320 P.2d 203 (1958); Clarida v.
Aquirre, 156 Cal. App. 2d 112, 319 P. 2d 20 (1958); Hall v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
152 Cal. App. 2d 80, 312 P.2d 739 (1957).
23 Hickambottom v. Cooper Transp. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d -, 9 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1960); Kowalski v. Shell Chemical Corp., 177 Cal. App. 2d 528, 2 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1960); Miller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 166 Cal. App. 2d 160, 332 P.2d 746 (1958).
24 Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal. 2d 630, 641, 255 P.2d 795, 802
(1953) (Schauer, J., dissenting).
25 PRossEn, TORTs 292 (2d ed. 1955).
26 James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
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